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Privacy and Trust in the Internet of Vehicles
Efstathios Zavvos, Enrico H. Gerding, Vahid Yazdanpanah, Carsten Maple, Sebastian Stein, m.c. schraefel
Abstract—The Internet of Vehicles aims to fundamentally im-
prove transportation by connecting vehicles, drivers, passengers,
and service providers together. Several new services such as park-
ing space identification, platooning and intersection control—to
name just a few—are expected to improve traffic congestion,
reduce pollution, and improve the efficiency, safety and logistics
of transportation. Proposed end-user services, however, make
extensive use of private information with little consideration
for the impact on users and third parties (those individuals
whose information is indirectly involved). This article provides
the first comprehensive overview of privacy and trust issues in
the Internet of Vehicles at the service level. Various concerns
over privacy are formalised into four basic categories: privacy of
personal information, trust, consent to provide information, and
multi-party privacy. To help analyse services and to facilitate
future research, the main relevant end-user services are tax-
onomised according to voluntary and involuntary information
they require and produce. Finally, this work identifies several
open research problems and highlights general approaches to
address them. These especially relate to measuring the trade-
off between privacy and service functionality, automated consent
negotiation, trust towards the IoV and its individual services, and
identifying and resolving multi-party privacy conflicts.
Index Terms—Privacy, Trust, Internet of Vehicles, IoV, IoT,
Connected Vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE Internet of Vehicles (IoV) is an emerging field whichis generally viewed as an extension of the Internet of
Things (IoT) [1]. The latter is a global network that con-
nects smart devices with each other. These devices feature
embedded hardware and software that allows them to sense
the environment and exchange information, and potentially
act upon that information. When these devices include ve-
hicles, this constitutes the IoV, with applications in Intelligent
Transportation, Autonomous Logistics, and Smart Cities [2].
The IoV can facilitate services which are likely to change
transportation drastically through shared knowledge, poten-
tially addressing a number of issues (e.g. traffic and accident
reduction). Compared to traditional Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITSs), the IoV puts extra emphasis on information
interaction among entities [3]. In the IoV, vehicles are able
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to communicate extensively using vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V),
vehicle-to-road (V2R), vehicle-to-human (V2H), vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I) and vehicle-to-sensor (V2S) connectivity
by employing various wireless communication technologies
[4]. Apart from these, human-to-human (H2H) interactions
through the IoV—and the human component in general—
become increasingly important as services evolve.
Of course, services should focus on improving physical
safety, convenience, and the cost of transportation [4]–[6].
The highly distributed nature of the IoV, however, also de-
mands that services need to be aware of—and capable of
embedding—privacy concerns. At the same time, privacy
preservation is in conflict with the usability of information [7].
A human-centred perspective will ensure the safe delivery of
services while protecting the privacy of personal information
[8]. Thus we are focusing on the people using the services—
whether of the vehicles themselves or the services hosted
within the context of the vehicle. Setting practical benefits
aside, privacy-awareness can further help users who are reluc-
tant to share information trust the IoV and its services.
Although security, privacy, and trust at a vehicle network
level have been explored to some extent in [9]–[12], privacy
and trust at the service level remain nebulous. Proposed IoV
services from the literature (see Section IV) utilise personal
information (e.g. location, behavioural patterns, videos), which
may additionally include involuntary information about third
parties (e.g. images of pedestrians or private properties). Such
improvident information sharing can lead to breaches in users’
and non-users’ privacy. Furthermore, access to information
through the IoV raises additional concerns, such as whether
the IoV can be used as a means to monitor people’s activities.
Privacy, however, can be a convoluted issue, because minimis-
ing information exchange can have negative impact on services
and trust in some cases, making it difficult to demonstrate that
service providers—and the IoV—are trustworthy.
Against this background, this work is the first to provide
a comprehensive overview of privacy concerns at the level
of end-user services in the IoV. We group these into four
categories, namely privacy of personal information, trust,
consent to provide information, and multi-party privacy. Other
privacy issues, e.g. protecting data from unauthorised access,
are related but outside the scope of this work. To discuss
these concerns, we make the following contributions. First, we
present a taxonomy of IoV services with regard to the privacy-
sensitive information they involve. The Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) distinguishes
between information based on its origin [13]. Accordingly,
we document information provided to the service voluntarily
(such as location, destination and images), and involuntary
©2021 IEEE
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information which others can obtain through observation or
inference. Following this, we identify the major research chal-
lenges regarding privacy and trust in the Internet of Vehicles,
present open problems and discuss potential solutions.
In the remainder of this paper, Section II provides a high-
level analysis of fundamental IoV concepts. In Section III,
privacy concerns in the IoV are formalised. Then, Section IV
documents IoV services according to the personal information
they involve, and discusses services extensively. Next, Sec-
tion V discusses the research challenges on privacy and trust
in the IoV explicitly, together with potential solutions. Finally,
Section VI summarises the findings and highlights future steps.
II. BACKGROUND
Early work on the IoV focuses on communication constraints
that the flux in the topology of vehicle-to-anything (V2X)
communications imposes. Hence, it is mainly concerned with
Vehicular Ad-hoc NETworks (VANETs) (see [2]–[6], [14],
[15]) and routing protocols (see [3], [5], [14]). In short,
VANETs achieve Peer-to-Peer (P2P) communication by turn-
ing every participating vehicle into a router that helps forward
messages. Nodes in VANETs self organise, but this imposes
inherent limitations. For example, there is no cooperation
among nodes in VANETs and this can make it difficult to
integrate many computing paradigms which advanced IoV
services require [15]. However, transitioning from VANETs to
the IoV is not straightforward. Various architectures have been
proposed for the IoV (e.g. see [16]). For example, [4] note that
a vehicle cloud can help address the IoV’s global character,
whereas [17] argue that fog computing can solve the latency
problems associated with cloud computing, and to instil the
required location awareness. Recent research thus considers
both clouds (e.g. [18] and [19]), and decentralised fog/edge
paradigms (e.g. [20], [21], and [15]). Fog computing pushes
intelligence towards the local area network, processing data in
fog nodes. Edge computing pushes intelligence, processing,
and communication further away from the cloud towards the
edge devices connected to fog nodes (e.g. vehicles, phones)
[17]. Furthermore, [21]–[23] consider social relationships in
the IoV (SIoV), and [24] probes further into cognition and
context awareness. Thus, achieving advanced services entails
an array of challenges, which span across hardware specifi-
cations, communication protocols and network architecture,
handling big data, standardisation, security and privacy, and
service models among others [2], [3], [5], [14], [25]. Of these,
this work is concerned with user privacy as well as with trust.
An in-depth analysis of architecture is beyond the scope of
this work, but a short summary will follow to help understand
how services build upon IoV infrastructure. Fundamental
layers are summarised in Table I. In the IoT, [26] introduced
the perception layer, the network layer and the application
layer. Early IoV archetypes use a similar architecture and
recent examples add several layers on top assuming TCP/IP
networking (e.g. [18]–[21], [24]). It is argued, however, in
[27] that the TCP/IP protocol is not sufficiently mobile for
the IoV. Based on the concept of Content-Centric Networking,
nodes express interests and data is communicated according
to interest labels instead of IPs. Interestingly this is found to
improve performance compared to using the TCP/IP protocol.
TABLE I
FUNDAMENTAL IOV LAYERS AND COMPONENTS
IoV Layer Components
Perception
All the sensors and hardware necessary to perceive the
road and objects, establish vehicle position and so on.
E.g. RADAR, LIDAR, temperature sensor etc.
Network
Hardware infrastructure, ad-hoc networks and commu-
nication protocols. E.g. LTE, WiFi, DSRC, RFID, On-
Board Units (OBUs), Application Units (AUs), Road-
Side Units (RSUs) [3], [5], [6], [14]
Application
Collection of tools needed for information storage, anal-
ysis and decision-making, as well as the infrastructure
needed to accommodate them.
In short, built on top of the perception layer, the network
layer accommodates the different modes of communication
(V2V, V2I, etc.). Within the vehicle, an On-Board Unit (OBU)
communicates information to other entities in the IoV, and
an Application Unit (AU) provides services and distributes
orders and information using the OBU. Outside the vehicle,
RoadSide Units (RSUs) are fixed along the road to preserve
coverage and connectivity to all vehicles. The application layer
is a collection of tools and infrastructure for information stor-
age/analysis and decision-making built on top of the network
layer. Taking advantage of the ample sensory information and
networking capabilities, various services for end-users have
been proposed for the IoV. Currently, there are no standards
to be used across services; each approach considers different
technologies and service concepts or models. However, it is
generally agreed that the IoV aims to address major societal
needs: (1) improving the vehicles’ and passengers’ safety,
and (2) improving the convenience and cost of transportation.
For example, [5] distinguish between safety services and user
applications (e.g. value-added services), whereas [14] identify
safety (e.g. collision avoidance), transport efficiency (e.g. real-
time traffic monitoring), and infotainment (e.g. gas station
information). In [2], services are classified into safe driving,
traffic control, convenience, infotainment and others.
However, these classifications offer little insight for dis-
cussing privacy concerns in the IoV, because in practice ser-
vices can be very complicated (see Section IV). To some extent
this is due to the complexity of individual services, which
often consist of different use cases, and it is often difficult to
disentangle these. To a larger degree, however, it is simply
because privacy is a dismissed aspect in most approaches.
Hence, to enable a robust analysis of challenges regarding user
privacy, this work provides a novel classification of proposed
services (see Section IV), as well as novel insights into
privacy-specific challenges in end-user services (Section V).
On the issue of trust, this is especially prominent when we
consider the social aspect of the IoV (SIoV). As [22] point out,
the SIoV focuses on the social interaction among vehicles and
among drivers. A similar concept for the IoT, SIoT, has been
identified in [26] as the convergence of the IoT and social
networks. In this view, every object can look for the desired
services using its social relationships, querying its friends
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and the friends of friends [28]. In the relationship model
presented in [21], relationships may not be equally lasting
or important. There are de-facto long-term relationships, and
short-term relationships that can evolve into long-term ones,
with [29] presenting a similar view. Thus, it is important
to select the right friends to achieve a satisfactory level of
service in the SIoV. However, the changing network topology,
constant linkage interruption and unknown network size in
the SIoV make node detection difficult, and trust relationship
construction very challenging [30]. This exploitation of social
relationships can entail several privacy concerns, which [31]
explain thoroughly. This topic encompasses the issues of pri-
vacy and trust among parties in the IoV (e.g. revealing friendly
relationships, revealing personal information to friends), and
sometimes results in a trade-off between privacy and trust.
Specifically, although more privacy can improve trust in the
IoV as a concept, it can hinder trust among parties in certain
services. These are discussed further in Section III-B, Sections
IV-F, IV-G in the context of vehicle platooning and intelligent
intersections respectively. Challenges and solutions for estab-
lishing trust are then discussed in Section V-C.
Finally, some believe that components of the IoV need to
exhibit context awareness. For example, [24] propose a model
for the Cognitive IoV which utilises hierarchical cognitive
engines and joint analysis to enhance decision-making and
exploit the market potential of the IoV. For all its potential
benefits, however, this entails several concerns with regard to
the users’ privacy. Related to this, Section IV-H discusses that
a variety of ‘smarter’ applications are directed at monitoring
and profiling individuals. Furthermore, enhanced intelligence
generally requires more information and, hence, less privacy,
but the benefits for many services remain unclear. This issue
is discussed in more detail in Sections IV-D, IV-G and V-B.
III. CONCERNS ABOUT PRIVACY AND TRUST IN THE IOV
To realise the envisioned IoV services, various types of in-
formation are necessary, including potentially sensitive infor-
mation such as the location of a vehicle or its destination.
It is not difficult to imagine that privacy is intertwined with
security when communication networks are considered, and
it is a well-established consensus that the IoV will be very
vulnerable to a multitude of attacks (e.g. [4], [10], [11], [17],
[32]–[34]). Security and privacy are vast topics, and this paper
will focus explicitly on privacy in end-user services.
There are a wide range of privacy issues in the IoV which
are likely to proliferate due to the IoV’s large scale, and due
to the need for many services to operate at short time-scales.
Existing work, such as [31], categorises concerns according
to data types and the kind of privacy that is breached (e.g.
privacy of images vs. privacy of behaviour), or focuses on
a specific data type such as location data [35]. Whereas our
work will also look into data types in the next section, data
types are not the only concern and this work considers privacy
issues in a more holistic manner. In particular, we identify
four major privacy concerns (see also Table II); personal
information privacy, multi-party privacy, trust, and consent.
Such a categorisation helps put the discussion on privacy
issues in the IoV into perspective. Each of these concerns—if
left unaddressed—can harm the credibility of the IoV severely.
A more in-depth discussion now follows.
TABLE II
A SUMMARY OF PRIVACY AND TRUST CONCERNS IN THE IOV. PERSONAL
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND MULTI-PARTY PRIVACY ARE DISCUSSED IN
SECTION III-A, AND TRUST AND CONSENT TO SHARE INFORMATION ARE






Users will need to share personal information. The
systematic collection and storage of information poses
risks for users, who may become vulnerable to attacks
and exploitation. Services should use the minimal infor-
mation necessary, but this may harm service quality.
Multi-party
Privacy
There is a significant concern that the privacy of third
parties (not users of the service) can be breached with
the IoV, to a greater extent than this is possible with
typical social networks. Monitoring peoples’ activities
through the IoV can impact trust in the IoV severely.
Trust
Trust has many facets in the IoV. Importantly, users need
to trust each other and providers, and the IoV itself. Lack
of trust can lead to reluctance in sharing information and




Users should consent for their information to be used,
but this is difficult to scale for the IoV. Privacy trade-
offs are often unclear and constant consent management
in real-time can be obtrusive in the IoV.
A. Privacy in the IoV
Providers of end-user services in the IoV need to obtain and
process enormous amounts of data [36]. The protection of
personal information, at the same time, is a legal require-
ment in the EU with the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) [37], and protecting personal data is emphasised as
increasingly important [38]. From the discussion in Section II,
it follows that users may need to reveal personal information
to service providers or other end-users. One could argue
that this is no different from using other Internet services.
However, IoV services may collect much more fine-grained
data such as route, video feeds, emotional state, and more (see
Section IV) in a more continuous manner. The systematic,
large-scale collection of information may make exploiting
personal information easier and more lucrative, and attackers
may find the IoV particularly attractive for launching attacks
targeted towards individuals [39], [40]. Furthermore, multiple
malware attacks have been performed on various critical
vehicle systems including braking systems [40]–[42], key-less
entry systems [43], and alert messaging systems [44].
Regarding sharing personal information, [10] stress that
the large number and diversity of participating parties—such
as vehicle and hardware manufacturers, consumers, service
providers, certificate authorities—makes aligning their inter-
ests difficult. Furthermore, more security usually means less
privacy, thereby drivers may be unwilling to give up their
privacy for some perceived security and have to worry about
their security at the same time. Users may also resist the IoV
if they believe they are being monitored. Indeed, our review
of proposed services for the IoV in Section IV shows that
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consumers may have good reasons to be reluctant. Ideally,
services should use the least amount of information necessary
to perform the task and/or provide the service effectively,
which is a crucial requirement of the GDPR [35]. This is
understood in principle, but is very difficult to quantify and
communicate to the user, and new approaches are necessary
for data-centric privacy in the IoV [1].
A further, pervasive, issue with privacy in the IoV is multi-
party privacy. This refers to the privacy of individuals who
are not the requesting party of the service and may not even
be IoV users at all. As [31] highlight, the fact that users can,
knowingly or even unknowingly, share data on other users
in the IoV, is a serious concern. In general, the excessive
exchange of personal information can result in user privacy
breaches. However, it is also possible for personal information
of non-users to be revealed or inferred through the interaction
among users and/or service providers, without the opportunity
to consent. For example, [45] find that many approaches using
AI in AUtonomous Vehicles (AUVs)—those vehicles which
can operate without intervention by the driver—rely on image
processing to train neural networks. The exchange of video
recordings per request or images for identifying empty parking
spaces may also contain information that breaches the privacy
of non-users.
Therefore, we define a “multi-party privacy conflict” as the
sharing of data from IoV participants that includes information
pertaining to other users or non-users. Apart from privacy
and consent, multi-party privacy also permeates trust. Even
when there are no direct repercussions for sharing personal
information, having the impression that the IoV may monitor
or access people’s activities can render the IoV undesired,
and this impression can be reinforced with actual multi-party
privacy conflicts. We recognise this as one of the most serious
privacy issues in the IoV, since it can lead both end-users and
wider society to perceive the IoV as untrustworthy.
B. Trust in the IoV
Trust is an important concern in the IoV with numerous
mentions in the literature (e.g. [31], [39], [46], [47]). On-
demand services will likely see unprecedented usage in the
IoV. Building trustworthy IoV systems, therefore, can be
highly complex due to the large scale of the IoV and the
sensitive information many services will require. As discussed
in Section II, trust is multifaceted and may include trust among
users (e.g. [46]), trust between users and service providers
[17], [32], trust between network nodes when propagating
information automatically [17], trust during fog orchestration
[17], finding trustworthy edge devices to offload computations
to [48], as well as the credibility of the IoV concept itself.
Users may avoid utilising the full spectrum of services,
focusing on services from trustworthy providers or services
which other trusted parties use (e.g. family). Moreover, people
may distrust the IoV altogether if they anticipate the risk that
their personal information can be exploited. This can remove
any incentives users may have to provide the required informa-
tion for the effective performance of the IoV. Meanwhile, eval-
uating trustworthiness in the IoV is highly challenging because
it is decentralised [16]. Trust must be handled in real time but
networks may be congested in peak hours and reaction time in
the IoV is limited. Thus, (1) minimising obscurity in service
models, (2) making the intent of information usage clear and
legally binding for providers, and (3) employing privacy-by-
design concepts could help protect the privacy of the user,
facilitating the process of building trust in the IoV.
In addition to data that is collected willingly for specific
purposes, data in the IoV can often be collected when not
required and can potentially be stored and reused without the
user’s consent [31]. Therefore, a significant related issue is
consent to share information. Among several obligations the
GDPR imposes on software operators and service providers, a
key obligation is user consent [33]. The complex granularity
in the IoV together with the fleeting character of services,
however, obfuscate the matter of making informed consensual
decisions. This may even result in exploitation of personal in-
formation (e.g. payment info, images, location history, driving
habits) and activity monitoring even with the user’s consent,
and may make it easier to inflict physical or psychological
harm.
Today, social networks and mobile applications constantly
refine privacy control features. However, privacy settings still
lack the ability to fine-tune permissions in some cases [49].
Consumers often lack enough information to make privacy-
sensitive decisions, and—even with sufficient information—
they are likely to trade off long-term privacy for short-term
benefits [50]. It is argued further in [50] that users consent
to personal data sharing by accepting opaque and inflexi-
ble policies which are rarely read, indicating that constant
consent requests may be inefficient and obtrusive. These are
disconcerting findings as we expect consent-based information
sharing to be the core of the IoV design and deployment.
IV. PERSONAL INFORMATION IN IOV SERVICES
To better understand where privacy concerns arise, this section
documents services in the context of the IoV more systemati-
cally, based on types of information services involve. Services
are then discussed in terms of privacy concerns. In general,
we observe that advanced IoV services use more information,
and rudimentary services use less. For example, [51] propose a
smart helmet for motorcyclists that shows driving information
such as speed and navigation information and sends an SMS in
case of collision. This requires little personal information, but
also does little to take advantage of the IoV’s potential. It will
become clear in this section that there is a trade-off between
privacy and service quality, something also supported by [7].
Thus, it will also be discussed whether the same or a similar
service can be acquired using less information.
Broadly, we have identified seven main categories of IoV
services. These include: event-driven services, parking space
identification, Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS), social network-
ing, vehicle platooning, intelligent intersections, and services
that are proposed as monitoring applications. Table IV pro-
vides an overview of information usage in IoV services. As
shown, services in the IoV generally require some form of
unique identification and GPS information. Many services
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additionally require route information and/or multimedia feeds
in the form of video, images or sound recordings. Moreover,
for most services, it is possible to determine involuntary
information on users or third parties, especially information
which can identify them and place them at certain locations.
TABLE III
INFORMATION GROUPS DOCUMENTED IN THIS STUDY
Group Explanation
ID
The information or ability to identify a vehicle, user, or
third party uniquely (e.g. name, licence plate, mobile
ID, and service account).
GPS Information that can be acquired through a GPS device(geolocation, velocity, direction, and timestamp).
Route Information on the vehicle’s origin, destination, and thepath travelled/to-travel.
Multimedia
feeds
Video, image, or sound information that can be acquired
either through on-board sensors or other devices such
as mobile phones.
Profile
Any information that can be used to profile a person.
This can include behavioural patterns, driving habits,
health records, and emotional state.
Interests &
Relationships
Information that can reveal a person’s interests (exclud-
ing destination and route) and/or social relationships.
Other
Information that is acquired from other sensors that
do not fall in the previous categories (e.g. RADAR,
LIDAR, ultrasonic).
A. Documenting Information in Services
Information in IoV services may include various types. We
group information into seven categories which can compro-
mise privacy. These follow closely information types used in
other work [7], [31]. To understand where privacy conflicts
can arise, information has been grouped according to common
uses and in categories that, in combination, can be dangerous
to the user and can be seen in Table III.
Moreover, in Table IV, for each service two items are
documented in each information category of Table III. The
first is whether the user is required to provide the information
voluntarily, indicated with a (•), and essentially refers to
‘provided data’ as per the OECD’s classification [13]. The
second is whether it is possible for information to be observed,
inferred or obtained in any way, where the subject may not re-
alise the information is being produced/recorded. We consider
this involuntary information, indicated with a (◦), aggregating
together OECD’s ‘observed data’, some of ‘derived data’, and
‘inferred data’. These data may concern a vehicle’s driver or
passengers, or third parties who may even be unaware of the
IoV. The provided list does not serve to exhaustively examine
proposed services in the IoV but rather to identify and evaluate
more general service categories in terms of privacy.
B. Event-driven Services
In [54], the concept of event-driven services is introduced. For
example, traffic lights can be switched to red automatically
before an ambulance passes through an intersection. The
logic is that an ambulance can broadcast event information
to fog nodes near its travelling route. Then, fog nodes like
cameras receive events and can generate an additional event
representing the ambulance observation at intervals. Finally,
cameras near crossroads can identify the ambulance via image
processing, and an event processing agent can switch the light
to red. Event-driven services can be problematic, not only with
respect to the privacy of personal information, but also regard-
ing the reliability of services. The authors in [54] recognise
that events generated by vehicles can be uncertain, which will
affect service quality. In turn, ensuring a certain level of quality
requires a large amount of information. Furthermore, event-
driven image processing in every intersection is disconcerting
with regard to potential uses and multi-party privacy.
C. Parking Space Identification
In [52], the authors propose a real-time parking space monitor-
ing and guiding system where the user sends a request to park
coupled with the GPS information. Then, the service allocates
nearby vehicles the task of photographing parking spaces.
Images are tagged with location, and the service analyses
and stores them. Upon finding a vacant space, the driver
is guided towards it. It is arguable that stored images may
contain information on parked vehicles and their identification,
together with their location and time, and may additionally
include information on pedestrians, which can breach multi-
party privacy and the privacy of personal information. Sys-
tematically storing such information may provide incentive for
hacking such a system e.g. to monitor a particular area.
Other approaches attempt to minimise the use of personal
information. However, we observe that such methods may
hamper the quality of parking space identification. For ex-
ample, [53] attempt to identify empty parking spaces by using
ultrasonic rangefinders instead of imaging. This is much less
invasive, but vehicles that carry the sensors still communicate
location data to the server. The authors note that an accurate
GPS may be more effective in measuring the size of the space,
because ultrasonic rangefinders are susceptible to echoes com-
ing from an angle. This highlights that there may be a trade-off
between privacy and effectiveness of the service. Furthermore,
we note that, while identification is undoubtedly useful, there
are alternatives that do not require any information at all, such
as parking lots whose availability drivers can already see today.
Although this is not as convenient, it could provide inspiration
for developing solutions that require less personal data.
D. Mobile CrowdSensing
The mobility in the IoV has inspired services that involve
some form of participatory Mobile CrowdSensing (MCS),
where users contribute sensory data to help infer information
on matters of common interest. It is straightforward to see
how such solutions could be deployed under the control of
an academic institution, but when it comes to fully deployed
commercial applications, these approaches require personal
information on several levels. MCS, therefore, yet suffers
from the common issue that the incentive for users to provide
information is unclear. Even in cases where the user decides
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TABLE IV
AMONG THE LIST OF SURVEYED PUBLICATIONS (COLUMN 1), WE IDENTIFIED IF THEIR PROPOSED IOV SERVICES EXPLOIT PERSONAL INFORMATION.
FOR EACH OF THE INFORMATION CATEGORIES IDENTIFIED IN TABLE III, WE DOCUMENT WHETHER INFORMATION PERTAINING TO EACH CATEGORY IS
PROVIDED BY THE USER VOLUNTARILY (•), INVOLUNTARILY (◦), OR BOTH (◦ •).
Information
Publication ID GPS Route Multimedia feeds Profile Interests/Relationships Other
Parking finder [52] ◦ • • ◦ •
Parking finder [53] • • ◦ •
Event-driven services [54] ◦ • • ◦ • •
Traffic monitoring [55] • • •
Traffic monitoring [56] • • • • •
Sensing tasks [57], [58] • • ◦ • • •
Navigation [59] • • • •
Cooperative routing [60] ◦ • •
Intention-aware routing [61] • ◦ • •
Cooperative charging [62] • • • •
Car-sharing rentals [63] ◦ • ◦ • ◦ •
Safety warnings [21] ◦ ◦ • ◦ • •
Automatic emergency response [19], [21] ◦ • • • ◦ •
Voice chat [64] ◦ • • ◦ • • •
Vocal warnings [65]
(Social navigation) ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • •
Location-based queries [20] ◦ • ◦ ◦ •
Proactive monitoring [66] ◦ • ◦ • ◦ • • ◦
Driver assistance [24] • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • •
Driver assistance [67] • ◦ •
Pedestrian identification [24] ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ ◦
Platooning [68]–[72] ◦ • • ◦ • •
Intelligent Intersection [73]–[81] • • ◦ •
Intelligent Traffic Light [82] • • ◦ ◦ • •
to use such a service, the privacy of systematically collected
personal information is a significant concern.
A system where users can upload the desired destination
in order to acquire traffic information is presented in [55].
An incentive mechanism is usually offered for provision of
data such as mobile id, speed, location, direction, from which
traffic conditions can be inferred. The authors, however do
not provide further information on the mechanism. In [56],
smartphones drivers carry are used to monitor road and traffic
conditions. Specifically, the accelerometer, microphone, GSM
radio, and GPS help detect bumps and potholes as well as
braking and honking. In [59], the authors present a system for
drivers to log events of interest using their phones. The data
is collected and processed in a server, where human input
is aggregated and the information is disseminated based on
the driver’s location. Then, it is used to provide up-to-date,
congestion-free paths in real time. For example, the path can
dynamically adjust due to a logged accident on the road.
These solutions do not address incentives to provide in-
formation explicitly and require user participation to operate
effectively. However, according to [55] it is natural for users
to be reluctant in providing information. In the case of [55],
[56], it can be argued that the acquisition of the service
itself is an incentive, and [59] make a stronger case for
this with a system that provides a more up-to-date route.
Providers could integrate privacy-by-design methods into their
service, to enhance the users’ trust in the provider, making
the incentive for users to participate more clear. For example,
in [83] Virtual Trip Lines (VTLs) are used, which associate
the traffic information transmitted with virtual landmarks,
rather than with the location and ID of the vehicle. This is
further employed in a proof-of-concept by [84]. The VTLs
consist of two GPS coordinates which draw a virtual line
across a roadway of interest. Phones have a list of VTLs and
upon crossing one, they can send an update with anonymised
position, speed and direction. A particularly interesting finding
is that only 2%-3% of mobile phones in the driver population
are necessary in order to obtain reliable traffic information.
An additional risk in the collection of traffic data is vehicle
trajectory reconstruction (e.g. [85]). Vehicle trajectories are
of high statistical value for many transportation applications,
such as designing public transit systems, environmental and
safety assessments, and modelling human behaviour [86].
Nevertheless, when paired with named data collection and
storage it can be problematic for the privacy of personal
information. Although [84] used VTLs to anonymise data
collection, they tried to minimise the possibility to reconstruct
trajectories by allowing mobile phones to ignore some VTLs,
and the server to ignore data points from neighbouring VTLs.
A method to select vehicles for specific sensing tasks is
shown in [57]. Task publishers announce multiple sensing
tasks with a reward budget, and a coordinator assigns these
to appropriate participants, with applicability in more general
settings. Participants are constrained by the road topology and
information needs to be collected continuously while they
are moving. The coordinator, therefore, needs to assign tasks
according to vehicle routes in order to improve coverage. It is
evident that participants need to share with the coordinator pri-
vate information regarding their route, trajectory and location.
An incentive mechanism is assumed to exist, without further
information. In [58], the authors propose a system to visualise
data from vehicle sensors through a central portal that collects
and analyses sensory data from vehicles. The portal provides
an API for developers to utilise the data, or to query vehicles
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for data. Collected data is characterised by sensor name and
ID and the vehicle ID, and is organised in terms of traces,
that is sets of sensor readings collected during a particular
drive. It can then be visualised according to these traces. This
architecture can be considered unaware of privacy concerns as
user data can be correlated to the time and location they were
obtained, as well as the car that obtained them and its route.
E. Social Networking
Under the scope of the SIoV, [60] propose cooperative vehicle
routing, where drivers cooperate in reducing the individual and
total travel time. This is more efficient than non-cooperative
methods, but every driver knows where all other drivers might
be going and via which route. A similar concept is presented
in [61], where electric vehicle (EV) drivers exchange routing
intentions through an intelligent transportation system (ITS),
and potential queuing times at charging stations are calculated.
Then, drivers decide on their routes so as to minimise their
expected cost of travel. It is understandable that each vehicle
must submit route information to the system.
A different concept is presented in [62], where EVs co-
ordinate to meet and exchange charge in order to minimise
total energy lost and the probability of EVs being stranded.
Coordination is done by maintaining distance and path quality
information about the immediate neighbourhood of a vehicle,
with decreasing detail as the distance increases. To test the
model, historical GPS data from taxis are used. However, it
is not straightforward what incentive drivers have to give up
sensitive personal information to meet people with whom they
have no prior established trust. [63] propose a service where
a provider owns vehicles available for sharing. The system
can recommend the nearest vehicle station based on the user’s
location, and vehicles are assigned to multiple passengers.
Although similar to ride-sharing, trust plays a significant role
in this service. Specifically, we deem that it is not reasonable to
assume that random people may meet to rent a vehicle jointly
with no mediating party present (e.g. an Uber driver).
The above cases involve obvious risks but others involve
more obscure ones. Vehicular Social Networks (VSNs) are
introduced in [64] with the idea of drivers joining discussion
groups along roadways. When the journey starts, the client
application logs into desired groups along the way, e.g. a
political discussion group, based on the driver’s location. Voice
messages are recorded and transmitted to the server with a
timestamp and user information. In a similar manner, [65]
integrate driver-provided information into a social navigation
system to calculate a personalised route. Drivers share events
of interest by recording voice tweets. Other drivers can hear
the tweet digests and instruct their navigation device to e.g.
avoid a certain route. Tweets are tagged with the vehicle’s
location, speed, current time, and driver ID. Such services
require multiple private data to operate, entailing various
privacy-related risks [7]. The fact that voice messages can be
recorded and stored can also be problematic for the user’s
privacy. In the case of social navigation, it could be used to
track a person’s presence at a certain location.
F. Vehicle Platooning
A vehicle platoon consists of a leading vehicle, and other
vehicles who follow the leader [69]. It is assumed that at
least the leading vehicle has to be driven by a driver, whereas
followers can move autonomously, but this could change with
the evolution of technology [69], [72]. Vehicles can also
dynamically join or leave platoons as is the case in [69].
Platooning expected to enhance safety, reduce travel costs and
increase road capacity [71], [87]. In fact, [88] show that the
capacity of a single highway lane can be increased by a factor
of two to three, if vehicles drive in platoons of up to 10 cars.
Considerable fuel saving has also already been demonstrated,
which in the case of truck platoons will have a large impact on
the cost of goods transportation [68], [87]. To accommodate
platooning, [72] use computer vision to detect lanes and the
lateral position of a vehicle, and a combination of RADAR
and LIDAR for longitudinal observations. In addition, vehicles
communicate with each other via IEEE 802.11p and infrared;
other projects utilise a similar configuration [69]–[71], [87].
An important issue in platooning are longitudinal oscillations
that may occur due to slow information propagation from the
lead vehicle to the back, when only local sensors are used.
To attenuate traffic shock-waves, it is thus paramount that
information from all vehicles be shared among the platoon.
[72] share the velocity of each vehicle, the braking signal, the
position in the platoon, obstacle locations, and the position
of each vehicle. In addition, it is necessary for each vehicle
to be uniquely identifiable within the platoon. Similarly, [70]
convey a vehicle’s sensory information to the other vehicles
and the data are fused to create a more complete perspective
of the platoon’s surroundings.
However, in relation to privacy, we identify two main issues.
First, information sharing can be exploited. For example, [89]
propose a system for a car to query and access sensors on other
cars as if they were its own. At the same time, most literature
also assumes that vehicles should be equipped with Radio-
Frequency (RF) identification, and [90] present a method based
on RF sensing for locating and navigating to a target of
unknown location, using only RF measurements provided by
a network of nodes surrounding the target (e.g. a platoon).
Therefore any car in a platoon can be located if someone
remotely queries its neighbours’ sensors. Second, the ability to
identify vehicles uniquely, and also visually, has implications.
For example, it is possible for vehicles in a platoon to infer
the origin, destination, and route of each other, and to monitor
the activities of their passengers visually. When acquaintances
use a platoon, e.g. to go to work, this may be acceptable.
However, in public platoons, it raises significant concerns on
the privacy of users, and it is not clear how platoon users can
trust other platoon members.
G. Intelligent Intersections
Intersection efficiency and scheduling is a central topic when
it comes to enhanced intelligence. In short, intelligent in-
tersections manage traffic through the usage of appropriate
coordination technology and algorithms, rather than through
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traffic lights and signals. This is expected to bring about better
space utilisation, and delay and accident minimisation [79].
A control agent is proposed in [75], which gathers informa-
tion about individual vehicles and provides the best sequence
of manoeuvres to vehicles crossing the intersection, avoiding
collisions by eliminating overlaps in vehicle trajectories. In
[74], cars negotiate crossing the intersection through a mixture
of centralised and distributed decision making, which solves a
time slot reservation problem. The authors, however, state that
the solution does not scale well with an increasing volume
of traffic. A similar observation is made in [73], using a
time-slot reservation multi-agent approach. Cars receive time
slots during which they may pass the intersection, and it is
of note that there is a trade-off between complexity and the
size of the grid considered in the intersection. [76] solve the
problem of evacuating vehicles from the intersection as soon as
possible, for each sequence of arriving vehicles, using dynamic
programming. To reduce complexity, they also present an ant-
colony optimisation approximation which works in real time.
In [78], decisions made by each vehicle are integrated into
scheduling. Vehicles are ordered according to arrival time and
properties of the vehicles, and the vehicle with the highest
priority is permitted to cross if its route does not conflict with
those already permitted. [80] propose that vehicles in the same
lane are divided into small groups and these groups are sched-
uled to cross an intersection through the use of a neuro-fuzzy
network-based mechanism. In [77], an auction is conducted
at each intersection so that travellers can self-organise using
a pricing mechanism which prioritises higher-valued trips. A
system agent at the same time bids benevolently at a level
which guarantees a minimum service quality for those not
willing to pay. A smart traffic light in [82] decides on the time
intervals of red and green based on various factors, including
the social characteristics of passengers. They introduce a social
preference parameter to make traffic handling more just, and
to reduce driver stress (e.g. late for work has higher priority).
Green light time is determined by the sum of priorities for
each direction of traffic. However, it is not explained why the
drivers would report their true preferences.
Despite the expected benefits of intelligent intersections,
there are challenges that go beyond those in [91]. Intelligent
intersections necessitate rigorous communication of informa-
tion that includes GPS information, and in some cases user
profile information to help negotiate priority. If such data
are stored or exploited, the routes of all vehicles can be
inferred. At the same time, less intrusive technologies have
been proposed. For example, [92] test an advisory system to
notify drivers of stop sign intersections, which detects stop-
sign beacons and provides an audible alarm. It was found
to help reduce approaching speed, and participating drivers
found it useful and unobtrusive. However, until we achieve
AUVs, there may be several services to assist drivers with
minimal sacrifice of privacy. Importantly, it still not clear
if and under which circumstances intelligent intersections
can provide significant benefits. For example, [73] find that
introducing only 10% human drivers into scenarios with AUVs
can render intelligent intersections as useful as traffic lights,
and [81] show that communication delays can severely impact
performance. Therefore, the key question is whether a trade-
off in privacy is worthwhile.
H. Potential Monitoring of Individuals in IoV Services
Beyond the aforementioned services, a variety of other con-
cepts have been proposed which may result in intensive
driver profiling and/or monitoring. In [19], the authors propose
automated calls to emergency services, family or friends,
which include information related to the situations the vehicle
has been in, including the number of passengers, direction,
location, and cause of emergency. Furthermore, they propose
that vehicles should communicate with parked vehicles to
cooperate in finding parking places. These services can breach
driver and passengers privacy, and raise concerns regarding
consent. The statistical analysis of usage information such
as driving behaviour, duration, and traffic rule violations is
proposed in [19] to obtain personalised insurance quotes.
The authors argue that this leads to reduced insurance cost
in theory. However, we argue that, in practice, this leads
to undesirable power asymmetries between insurers and end
users. In addition, it may harm the trustworthiness of insurance
firms as drivers may feel they are being monitored.
In [20], vehicles are informed of accidents via beacons. The
vehicle can then request a video feed from a camera facing the
accident. While it is understandable that, in emergencies, such
a function could be useful, in general the concept that anyone
may request video from a location of interest is very troubling.
Similarly, [24] envision that driving behaviour, emotional
condition, and fatigue state can be uploaded to a private
cloud which can infer personalised rules about drivers. Such a
function can lead to serious trust issues during the deliberation
of the service (within the same vehicle) or prior to that,
e.g. it may provoke racial profiling and discrimination. [24]
also propose that enhanced intelligence could help identify a
pedestrian target, analyse information such as height and age to
predict dangerous acts of the target. In [66], data from vehicles
are used for proactive urban monitoring, and authorities can
search the vehicle network for witnesses or evidence. These
concepts, while proposed with good intentions, may trigger
several multi-party privacy conflicts and may also raise ethical
concerns with regard to the social relationships such systems
would encourage.
A further range of applications is presented in [21], where
real-time data from vehicles can be collected based on social
relationships. For example, the car holds knowledge about the
driver’s social contacts and uses this to build a social circle
with other vehicles sharing the same interests. In addition,
the vehicle keeps the fog updated by constantly synchronising
data. This way, safety notifications from relationships can be
received, such as for roadworks, based on their observations.
Whereas the exploitation of social relationships has several
advantages, it also has disadvantages. Specifically, many of
the social relationships may depend on mutual interests. This
could be, for example, the same workplace or having the
same destination. Users may thus be able to infer personal
information of their social relationships by using such services.
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V. CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The preceding sections have identified several issues and
challenges with regard to privacy in IoV end-user services. It is
interesting to note that, although the privacy of users and non-
users, and the trust in the IoV are clearly important, consumer
surveys around connected and autonomous vehicles do not
highlight specific ways in which privacy could be affected. For
example, a study in the UK by Autodrive and the University of
Cambridge, showed mixed opinions in the general population,
on whether they would use driver-less vehicles [93]. Similarly,
Deloitte showed mixed results in Japan, the U.S. and Germany,
with less than 50% of the participants believing connected
vehicle technology will be beneficial [94]. These results were
obtained while failing to explain to participants the implica-
tions of the information sharing involved, or privacy concerns
concepts such as platooning introduce, which we believe is
crucial to evaluate consumer trust in the IoV. Additionally,
the swift and ephemeral nature of services make it difficult to
design usable solutions that protect privacy and enhance trust
without compromising functionality. This is expected to pose
a significant hurdle for IoV services to overcome.
To provide insights into the privacy and trust issues in
the IoV, and to discuss areas of interest for future research
directions, this work identifies six major challenges which are
summarised in Table V. These are discussed in more detail in
the remainder of this section.
TABLE V
PRIVACY AND TRUST CHALLENGES IN THE IOV
Challenge Summary
Standardisation
Protecting privacy is difficult because of the range
of services and the lack of standardisation. There is
a need for new privacy protection concepts, and for




There is a trade-off between privacy and function-
ality in many IoV services. Quantifying this and
finding a balance is a challenging future direction.
Building
Trust
Establishing trust is expected to be significantly
challenging, given the ad-hoc nature of the IoV,
and large-scale information propagation. Moreover,
sometimes there is a trade-off between privacy and
trust. Working towards improving both privacy and
trust at the same time is a worthwhile topic.
Meaningful
Consent
Consent negotiation is obtrusive, especially when
consent needs to be constantly provided in real-time.
Leaps need to be made before automated consent
negotiation is effective and meaningful in the IoV.
Incentives
Engineering
The incentives for the user to provide information are
unclear in many services. Incentive mechanisms are
taken for granted in most services and it is necessary




Multi-party privacy in the IoV needs comprehensive
research. The opportunities for breaching the privacy
of third parties are many, while the opportunities
to identify and defend against breaches are few.
This can have serious consequences for the safety of
individuals and can harm trust in the IoV thoroughly.
A. User Privacy and Privacy-by-Design
We expect user privacy protection to be challenging, and this
may have a significant impact on the adoption of IoV related
technologies, as well as on the welfare of users themselves.
For instance, the cognitive IoV (Section II) is envisioned to
utilise various types of personal information such as facial
expressions and emotional state. However, to preserve the
privacy of users and, at the same time, to enhance intelligence
does not necessarily mean that every application in the IoV
has to be over-engineered. For example, [67] propose a method
that can be effective in driver fatigue detection by recording
only ECG data obtained from the driver. Additionally, [95]
review a multitude of driver fatigue detection systems that
record only one kind of information such as blood pressure or
sleep patterns. Whereas such information could be exploited,
e.g. to infer users’ reaction to advertisements, they are mindful
of privacy than the thorough driver profiling proposed in [24].
TABLE VI
AN OVERVIEW OF USEFUL PRIVACY-BY-DESIGN METHODS FOR THE IOV
Paper Method Application
[23], [29] Privacy Labels Data privacy
[1], [33] Blockchain methods GDPR compliance
[83], [84] Virtual Trip Lines Anonymous data collection
[96] Private Info. Retrieval Anonymous data retrieval
[97]–[99] Differential Privacy Anonymous data retrieval
[100]–[103] Group Signatures Anonymous signatures
Due to the broad array of applications and contextual con-
cerns, standardisation and privacy-by-design are not straight-
forward and these are areas open to research. Some inspira-
tional work on privacy-by-design for the IoV is summarised
in Table VI. In more detail, [23] and [29] propose dividing
content according to privacy labels. An authority determines
which part of a message must be public, and OBUs can only
exchange public content. Private content can then only be
shared by the owner of the vehicle by labelling it as protected.
As [22] note, however, a key weakness is that it relies on
the recipient honouring the privacy label. A further concept,
compatible with privacy-by-design, is the blockchain. This was
introduced with the advent of cryptocurrencies and refers to
a decentralised and distributed digital record of transactions
across computers, with applications in privacy protection and
cryptography. In [1], the IoV is used as a case-study of the IoT,
and integrating the blockchain into IoV system architecture
is found to have a significant positive effect on preserving
user privacy and complying with GDPR privacy regulations. A
formal model is proposed in [33], for automatically verifying
GDPR compliance on data processing units, and for verifying
the compliance of smart devices during their design.
Privacy-by-design can be further employed per individual
service, as in [84] who employed VTLs to collect anony-
mous traffic data. Similarly, [96] attempt to protect privacy
in location-based services i.e. services which answer users’
queries to points of interest using Private Information Re-
trieval. Authors find that replacing user location with the road
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the user is on reduces computational complexity and service
error compared to grid-partitioning models. Further work in-
cludes differential privacy which has its roots in cryptography
(discussed in detail in [97] and [98]). In short, this concept pro-
poses that information about statistical databases can be pub-
lished without disclosing the private information of database
records, by introducing some amount of noise in the data. This
is extended in [99] into ε-differential privacy, which defines the
privacy loss mathematically to determine an amount of noise
with similar effect as removing the individual’s data from the
database. A further well-defined concept are group signatures,
which allow users to sign messages anonymously on behalf of
a group. There are provably secure approaches [100], lattice-
based approaches suited for dynamically growing populations
[101], more recently extended for use in the IoT [102]. Modern
schemes also include mesh signatures, which [103] adapt for
use explicitly with the IoT. In this scheme, users can generate a
mesh signature using their atomic signatures, without revealing
the atomic signatures used.
B. Privacy and Functionality Trade-off
As we have seen in Section IV, in many cases, there is a trade-
off between privacy and functionality. This is interesting not
only from the users’ point of view, but also for the business
aspect of services. It is currently unclear whether the gain for
users for certain services outweighs the sacrifices in privacy
and there are no good approaches and tools to help users make
informed decisions. At the same time, there are opportunities
to investigate whether similar or better services exist which
could utilise less information. Ideally, users who care about
privacy should be able to easily compare the use of private
information by similar services to make such decisions.
For example, in contrast to the more mindful VTL concept
discussed in Sections IV-D and V-A, [59] propose traffic
monitoring where drivers provide named sensory data and
can also input events of interest along their route. This, in
theory, results in more up-to-date navigation, but compromises
privacy compared to the usage of VTLs. Concerning intelligent
intersections, as discussed in Section IV-G, it is not yet
clear whether a trade-off in privacy is beneficial in realistic
scenarios. Additionally, [87] show that the closer vehicles are
together in a platoon, the higher the savings on fuel. However,
the closer vehicles, the lower the privacy of passengers may
be (e.g. passengers are more visible to others).
Therefore, we believe that, to better incorporate privacy pro-
tection into services, future work should focus on quantifying
the trade-off between the loss of privacy and service quality.
In this paper we introduced a qualitative approach to help
visualise the loss of privacy (see IV-A), and more quantitative
methods are still an open challenge. Whereas concepts such
as ε-differential privacy combined with efficiency metrics (e.g.
simulations) can help measure the trade-off between privacy
and functionality, these approaches can only be applied to
limited types of services which exploit statistical databases.
Considerably more work is needed before the trade-off can be
quantified in a more general and meaningful manner.
C. Establishing Trust
As seen in Section IV, many services in the IoV involve
large numbers of participants. To accommodate this, services
may therefore need multi-hop routing, cloud/fog computing
(Section II) and multiple network channels, which makes es-
tablishing trust among participants (vehicles, RSUs, providers)
a significant challenge [9]. For example, [17] note that two
limitations are that (1) edge devices (e.g. cars, phones) will
face difficulty in identifying trusted nodes and (2) using trusted
third parties is very difficult when considering only segments
of the whole network. It is further noted by that, due to the
large scale and number of stakeholders in the IoV, choosing
who is going to be a Certificate Authority (CA) will be
challenging [10] and secure key generation is expected to be
very difficult [9]. On top of these, devices such as vehicles,
sensors, gateways and control units will need to be updated
constantly. Toward secure software updates, [47] propose a
blockchain-based identity and trust management framework.
Apart from the technical aspect of establishing trust, there
are significant conceptual challenges as well. Following from
the discussion in Section IV-F, an obvious candidate solution
to trust issues in, for example, vehicle platoons could be to
use a recommendation system where a driver can search for
platoons with better ‘trustworthiness’, similar to the work in
[28]. However, this, in turn, requires users to have profiles
and this could provide incentive to sacrifice some privacy to
improve one’s trustworthiness. An issue, thus, is that more
privacy for the user may, on one hand, lead to improved
trust in the IoV as a system but, on the other hand, it may
compromise trust amongst users and/or service providers. A
recommendation system is used in [30] as well, in the context
of SIoV services. Historical access records of nodes are
combined with node recommendation information in order to
construct social relationships between nodes based on implicit
similarities among vehicles. In addition, vehicles trajectories
are used to estimate vehicle interaction time. These pose
significant privacy concerns and highlight that in many cases
there may be trade-offs between trust and privacy.
TABLE VII
AN OVERVIEW OF TRUST ESTABLISHMENT METHODS FOR THE IOV
Paper Method Application
[28] Rater-based trustworthiness Trust among nodes
[46] Ratee-based trustworthiness Trust among nodes
[39], [104] Digital Forensics (Blockchain) Evidence for crimes
[39] Digital Forensics Evidence for crimes
[48] Blockchain methods Trusted fog computing
[105] Blockchain methods Security & trust issues
[32], [106] Trusted Authority mediation User & Service trust
[107] Relationship-based model Initialising trust
[30] Relationship-based model Trust among nodes
Nevertheless, significant work to inspire future research
has been carried out recently towards improving privacy and
trust at the same time (see Table VII for a summary), but
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there are several limitations. Although these are privacy-by-
design methods, we discuss them here because they focus
on solidifying trust. One direction is toward digital forensics,
and a relevant summary in the context of the IoT can be
found in [104]. In the IoV, [39] propose creating evidence
stories that are not related to particular interactions and actors
using blockchain techniques. An investigator can then decide
which stories to investigate, and the system is difficult to
compromise. A challenge, however, is the plethora of possible
evidence, data formats and distributed infrastructure. Other
work focuses on trust management. Traditional rater-based
models store the reputation of each node in other nodes it
interacts with, but networks in the IoV are ephemeral. Ratee-
based management in [46] instead stores reputation rated by
others during interactions within the node itself, and a CA
server ensures the authenticity and integrity of trust informa-
tion. This results in faster information propagation and better
transaction success rate compared to rater-based methods.
The blockchain is again used in [48], where parked vehicles
compete with each other to earn income from the computation
offloading service, the goal being to maximise service perfor-
mance and reduce user fees. Although the blockchain (see
also Section V-A) can indeed address a number of privacy
and trust issues in compliance with GDPR regulations, it
still suffers from security (cyber-attack) and trust issues at
other levels, such as when propagating information. Several
challenges with regard to the blockchain are discussed in
detail in [105]. Initialising trust degrees among vehicles is
difficult, and [107] propose initialising trust values based
on offline social relationships and a satisfaction rating for
interactions, but they do not show a mechanism to guarantee
truthful ratings. It is noted that in the latter two approaches,
anonymity is not guaranteed. To address anonymity, [106]
and [32] propose facilitating interaction between IoV entities
through a trusted authority (TA). In [106], vehicles register
to a TA and authenticate with each other without knowing
who the other party is. They show that this scheme can
resist numerous types of attacks, while improving computing
capacity and communication overhead compared to previous
schemes. In [32], a similar approach facilitates privacy when
a user requests a service; a cloud broker managed by the TA
connects the user to a registered service, and the selection
of provider is hidden for the user. Third parties cannot link
intercepted messages to the vehicle or provider. However,
this approach makes it difficult for providers to build their
trademarks in practice, and does not leave much room for the
user to choose a service provider either. Furthermore, it is not
clear how the TA can handle perhaps many millions of such
transactions at any given time.
D. Consent Negotiation
As discussed, privacy-by-design solutions are promising in
various IoV services. However, it is understandable that this
may not be possible for all applications in the IoV. Fur-
thermore, the issues of trust and consent (raised in Section
III-B) necessitate solutions that are efficient when it comes to
managing privacy and supporting consent negotiation.
To address the limitations of manually managing complex
privacy settings and requests to access personal data, [108]
propose the use of agents to autonomously negotiate these
on behalf of the user. In their model, the agent learns from
interactions and the user can make further manual refinements.
The authors find this can be effective in capturing the prefer-
ences of the user and in negotiating on the user’s behalf, but
there are several challenges open to research. For example, the
evaluation in [108] was limited to only five different data types.
As the authors rightly note, in reality, negotiations are expected
to be much more complicated and to include many more issues
at the same time, such as who the receiving party is (i.e. to
build trust), for how long the data is to be retained, the purpose
of the data collection, and the privacy risks involved. Capturing
the preferences of these options while minimising user bother
is a major challenge. Among other challenges [109] identified
in automated negotiation, we emphasise the following two.
First, the user needs to trust the agent enough to surrender
control, but at the same time it is challenging to obtain the
user’s trust and to make automated negotiation widely adopted.
Second, limited access to automated negotiation technology
could further intensify existing social injustice, something
which we extend as a future direction through all levels of
life-changing automation in the IoV (e.g. driver-less vehicles).
E. Incentives for Providing Information
In Sections IV-D and IV-E we highlighted many cases where
the it is not clear whether there is an incentive for users
to provide personal information. Although the system or the
service benefits from having the data, this does not necessarily
mean the individual providing this information benefits as
well. Hence, in this paper, we identify incentives as a further
major challenge in the IoV. This includes incentives to provide
personal information, and also incentives to use automated
agents such as those in V-E, and the agent that negotiates
crossing an intersection in [77] (Section IV-G). Approaches
such as [55] and [57]—presented in Section IV-D—assume
incentive mechanisms for users to give personal information
based on the idea that the service itself is a reward.
The service itself is indeed a tangible benefit for the user.
However, it is still very difficult to weigh this gain versus the
information sacrificed in order to make informed decisions,
and this is obtrusive for the user when it has to be done
constantly. To have an incentive, the user must be able to
perceive trade-offs as beneficial. For example, even if only
one negotiation severely backfires for the user (e.g. user is
exploited), this may be enough to lose trust in automated
negotiation completely, and this effect could propagate across
the user’s social contacts. This is a major risk in the IoV
considering the potentially very high number of such data
provision negotiations likely to take place for each user.
Related to the above and also to the discussion in Sections
V-B and V-C is the fact that, it is challenging for ordinary
users to understand the risk of sharing information. Services
like Facebook are indeed free for the user to use, but follow
a business model where the user is actually the commodity
the service sells to third parties like advertisers [110]. This
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is done by exploiting and monetising the user’s data, and it
is argued that users should have a right to know the value of
their data [111]. Whereas there is literature on how to compute
the value of data for providers (see [110] and [111]), little has
been done on identifying and measuring the risks for users.
Furthermore, it is not yet clear how incentive mechanisms
can be validated effectively. [108] offered real money as incen-
tive to participants for using an agent, and participants were
told the shared data would be published online. However, it is
still not clear how this translates to realistic usage scenarios.
Users may decide to share harmless data to gain money, even
knowing that data will be published. This does not necessarily
mean that they would share data in a realistic scenario with
multiple issues under negotiation and more obscure rewards.
The situation that is of more interest in the IoV, is what
happens when users have to share sensitive data to obtain a
particular service they want or need. This constitutes a signif-
icant challenge for the design, validation, and deployment of
incentive mechanisms in the context of personal information
negotiation. Current research cannot provide a robust answer
today and has to be extended significantly to do so.
F. Multi-party Privacy
Due to the involvement of various parties, resolving multi-
party privacy conflicts is challenging. Furthermore, the poten-
tial for multi-party privacy conflicts may instil doubt in the IoV
and its services, and could render the IoV to be perceived as
untrustworthy. The IoV could benefit from current research in
social networks focusing on detecting and resolving privacy
conflicts, when users have conflicting privacy preferences
on a co-owned data item. Research in social media, which
introduces the capability for users to compromise is listed in
Table VIII. In more detail, in [112] users bid to decide who
will determines the sharing decision for the item. However,
as [113] note, users may have difficulty in understanding
mechanism and in specifying appropriate bid values, plus
bidding for each co-owned item can be cumbersome.
TABLE VIII
AN OVERVIEW OF MULTI-PRIVACY METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORKS.
NOTE THAT ALL APPLY IN NEGOTIATING THE SHARING DECISION FOR THE
CO-OWNED DATA ITEM IN QUESTION.
Paper Method
[112] Auction to determine who makes the information-sharing decisions
[114] Majority voting mechanism for conflict resolution
[115] Veto voting mechanism for conflict resolution
[116] Uploader decides the voting mechanism for conflictresolution
[117] Automatic inference of the resolution method
[118] Game theoretic method incorporating social pressure
[119] Game theoretic method incorporating reciprocity
Further work is involved with voting mechanisms, where
users vote for sharing the item or not. These votes are
aggregated to reach an outcome with a majority mechanism
in [114] and a veto voting mechanism in [115]. Various
voting mechanisms are combined in [116] and the uploader
decides which mechanism will be used, but this assumes that
the uploader anticipates the consequences of sharing, and
that there is no malicious intent [113]. In [117], the model
chooses automatically among different negotiation methods
taking into account the preferences of users, the sensitivity of
the content, and the relationships among the audience for the
content. Research has also considered the strategic interaction
among participants in conflicts. However, [113] note that,
although these approaches assume rationality, rationality is
not necessarily observed in users’ actual behaviour. Some
approaches allow for social pressure [118] or reciprocity [119],
but there are more social factors in multiparty privacy conflicts
such as reputation, trust, and accountability [113].
However, it is important to note that multi-party privacy in
the IoV is conceptually different from multi-party privacy in
the social media. In social media, a conflict can occur due to
data sharing among users, which includes data on other users.
In comparison to this, we provided a more loose definition for
multi-party privacy conflicts in the IoV in Section III-A. This
is because the systematic collection of involuntary information
in the IoV along with the IoV’s large scale pose a significant
risk also to the privacy of non users (e.g. see parking space
identification in Section IV-C and on-demand video feeds in
Section IV-H). It is thus very likely that users and non users
will be largely unaware of multi-party privacy conflicts in the
IoV, thereby only a small amount of conflicts will be able to be
negotiated let alone resolved. This makes designing solutions
resolve multi-party privacy conflicts very challenging in the
IoV, and calls for comprehensive research. Furthermore, it
stresses the necessity for privacy-by-design solutions which
could enhance confidence in the IoV in the first place.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Privacy in the Internet of Vehicles is an under-researched topic
when it comes to end-user services such as parking space
identification, platooning and intelligent intersections. At the
same time, proposed services (discussed in Section IV) require
multiple types of private data. To determine research gaps and
classify issues, this paper has documented services in the IoV
according to the types of information that is collected.
A thorough review of services reveals that sharing personal
information can help, but may not be crucial for improving
certain IoV services. For example, in Section IV-D it was
discussed that it is possible to obtain very good estimates of
traffic conditions by utilising anonymous data from a limited
number of drivers. For other services, personal information
does help but the incentives for end-users to provide this
information are not always explained adequately. For instance,
Section IV-G discussed that intelligent intersections may not
necessarily be beneficial, especially in environments that in-
clude mixed vehicle types. At the same time, it will be difficult
and obtrusive for drivers to manage privacy and to make
informed decisions on sharing information. It is also an issue
that—aside from compromising functionality—improving the
privacy of services may also impact trust among service users.
Further research directions have been identified in Sec-
tion V. Specifically, open research problems are: privacy-by-
















Fig. 1. Among the 31 papers that can help address privacy and trust issues in the IoV (in Tables VI-VIII), a large portion has to do with Blockchain
technologies, Group Signatures, Voting Theory, Node Trustworthiness Evaluation, and Differential Privacy. Some of these further utilise Game Theory and
Trust Authority-based service provision. With ’Other’ we denote those approaches which are highly context specific or few in literature; that is work that
utilises Privacy Labels, Virtual Trip Lines, Digital Forensics, Auctions, and Private Information Retreival.
design standardisation, establishing trust, incentives to provide
information, measuring privacy and service quality trade off,
consent negotiation and resolving multi-party privacy conflicts.
This work has presented several approaches that can be
used toward improving privacy and trust in the IoV, and a
summary of the methods found is given in Figure 1. We
especially believe that addressing multi-party privacy is highly
significant. That is because it can affect both users of the IoV
and non-users, making it difficult to track and address privacy
conflicts, and easy to exploit information.
To conclude, dismissing privacy issues can lead to severe
adverse effects due to the vast exchange of personal informa-
tion in the IoV, as well as the large number of participants. It
can result in the IoV being perceived as a monitoring system
or as an intrusive technology. To alleviate such concerns and
minimise opportunities for information exploitation in the IoV,
it is crucial that academia, the industry, and policy makers
make significant collaborative efforts to address the privacy
issues and challenges this work has discussed.
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